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THE JUVENILE COURT CONCEPT IN MISSOURI:
ITS HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT-THE NEED FOR
NEW LEGISLATION
NOAH WEINSTEINi"
The present method of treatment of neglected and delinquent chil-
dren by the juvenile court in Missouri is a dual heritage from their
treatment under the criminal law and in the courts of equity as it has
evolved during the last century and a third. This mixed ancestry may
underlie some of the problems that have arisen to impede the proper
development of the juvenile court.
Each year in Missouri thousands of neglected and delinquent chil-
dren are brought to the attention of the juvenile court and its per-
sonnel. At the present rate there will be at least 60,000 such children
during the next decade, and, for many reasons, there is cause to be-
I ieve that their number will far exceed that figure. They are a sizable
part of our society. How they will be examined, treated, and disci-
plined, and in what form these children will become adult members of
the community, is a vital concern to all of us in the state.
A proposed act "to facilitate the care, protection and discipline of
children who come within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court"' has
been prepared by a joint committee of the Missouri General Assembly
for consideration by the 1957 legislative session. This measure, which
would replace the present forty-six year old juvenile court act, pro-
poses to write into our statute law the changes in juvenile court pro-
cedures brought about by judicial interpretations of the act over the
years and to recognize the other substantial progress accomplished in
the specialized field of handling neglected and delinquent children in
modern times.
The proposed act provides a really effective means for the preven-
t ;on of serious delinquency and criminality. It furnishes the minimum
tools needed by the court for helping re-form the personality and char-
acter of juveniles brought before it and, thus, prevents the develop-
ment of children into hardened criminals and enables them to play a
useful part in society.
For an understanding of how the juvenile court has developed as it
has, this article first considers the background of this particular field
of law as it existed in fissouri during the nineteenth century. In do-
ing this we shall endeavor to review the various laws and some of the
decisions having particular application to children. Following this, we
-( Circuit Judge, St. Louis County, Missouri.
1. SENATE Bill No. 15, 69th Missouri General Assembly § 211.010 (1957).
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shall turn our attention to the important special laws enacted by the
Missouri legislature in the early part of the present century having
for their specific purpose the special treatment of children, and shall
recount some of the leading court decisions interpreting these laws.
Finally we shall examine the details of the proposed juvenile court
legislation prepared by the joint legislative committee for the present
session of the Missouri General Assembly.
EQUITY COURTS AND MINORS
The first Constitution of the State of Missouri, adopted "at the town
of St. Louis" on July 19, 1820, vested the judicial power, as to matters
of law and equity, in a supreme court, in a chancellor, in circuit courts,
and in such inferior tribunals as the general assembly might from
time to time establish.2 This constitution vested in the court of chan-
cery original and appellate jurisdiction in all matters of equity, and a
general control over executors, administrators, guardians, and mi-
nors.3 The General Assembly of Missouri, meeting at St. Charles on
the first Monday in November 1822, ratified an amendment to the con-
stitution which abolished the office of chancellor and vested chancery
jurisdiction in the supreme court and circuit courts.4
On January 7, 1825, the general assembly, in defining the jurisdic-
tion of circuit courts, provided that they were to have general control
over minors and were authorized to "proceed therein according to the
rules, usages and practice of courts of equity unless otherwise pro-
vided for by law."s The general control over minors by courts of
equity described in the 1825 law gave recognition to the power that
had been exercised by such courts for more than two centuries in Eng-
land. The origin of this jurisdiction is variously ascribed to the fiction
of the right of the king as parens patriae, which, after the abolition
of the Court of Wards, vested in the king the protection of all the in-
fants in the realm; or to the general jurisdiction of equity over trusts
and the treatment of guardianship as a trust; or to an old common-
law writ dealing with wards; or to a usurpation justified because it
was the beneficent exercise of power peculiarly equitable in its na-
ture.6
The validity of the exercise of the power of a court of equity in the
protection of personal rights of a minor, even absent the infant's
ownership of property, was asserted by the Missouri Supreme Court
in a decision which recognized the right of a court exercising equitable
2. M o. CONST. art. V, § 1 (1820), 1 Mo. ANN. STAT. at 88 (Vernon 1951).
3. MO. CONST. art. V, § 10 (1820), 1 Mo. ANN. STAT. at 89 (Vernon 1951).
4. MO. CONST. amend. art. 1 (1822), 1 Mo. ANN. STAT. at 100 (Vernon 1951).
5. Mo. Laws 1825, at 268-69.
6. See Ex parte Badger, 286 Mo. 139, 226 S.W. 936 (1920).
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jurisdiction to remove a child from its own parents if necessary to
protect the child and promote its welfare.7
By an act approved January 17, 1825, the circuit court sitting as a
court of chancery was vested with jurisdiction in all causes of divorce,
alimony, and maintenance, including the power to enter orders affect-
ing the care, custody, and maintenance of the children involved.8
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE, PROBATE, AND COUNTY COURT JURISDICTION
OVER MINORS-ADOPTION BY DEED
Although the jurisdiction of equity may have been sufficiently broad
to deal with all problems of minors, the legislature, perhaps prompted
by the failure of equity to assert itself, deemed it necessary to dele-
gate portions of this jurisdiction to various other courts. Thus, in
1824, a justice of the peace was authorized to bind a minor, who was
found to be a vagrant, as an apprentice until his twenty-first birth-
(lay."
Certain jurisdiction over classes of minors was also conferred on the
probate court, which by an act approved January 17, 1825, had the
power to "bind out," as an apprentice or servant, any poor child who
was or may be a charge of the county, or a child who begs, or whose
parents be- or are charges of the county, or the children of any poor
family if "the father is a habitual drunkard, or if there is no father,
where the mother is of bad character or suffers her children to grow
up in habits of idleness without any visible means of obtaining an
honest livelihood .. .""J until such child became twenty-one years of
age, if a male, or eighteen years of age, if a female.1'
In 1857, the general assembly provided for the adoption of any
child by deed executed, acknowledged, and recorded as in the case of
conveyances of real estate. Upon the recordation of such a deed, the
clild had the same rights and privileges as a child had "against lawful
parents."', The natural parents were not required to join in the deed
of adoption. Thus the supreme court held that the adopted child be-
came in a legal sense the child of the adopting parents and at the same
time remained the child of its natural parents and was not deprived
of its rights of inheritance." This act also provided that the county
court' had the power to change the name of the child so adopted.
Subsequently this latter provision was amended and the power to
7. IWd.
S. Mo. Laws 1825, at 330-31.
9. Mo. Laws 1825, at 784.
10. Mo. Laws 1825, at 132.
11. Ibid.
12. Mo. Laws 1857, at 59.
1:3. Clarkson v. Hatton, 143 Mo. 47, 44 S.W. 761 (1898).
14. County courts were defined as "tribunals for the transaction of county
business." Mo. Laws 1825, at 268.
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change the name of an adopted child was vested in the probate court.9
The Thirty-fifth General Assembly authorized any "society" incor-
porated under the provisions of chapter 21, article 10, of the Revised
Statutes of 1879, having as one of its objects the care or protection of
abandoned, ill-treated, and friendless children, to act as guardian of
the person of any child when so appointed under the provisions of that
act. 6 The act authorized the probate court to act upon the application
of any such "society" alleging the circumstances of the "abandonment,
ill-treatment or neglected condition" of any child under the age of
fourteen years found in the jurisdiction of the court.
Under such proceedings "unfitness or incompetency of the parents
shall be determined by a jury, if one is demanded."'1 Upon such a
finding, the probate court was authorized to appoint the "society" as
guardian of such child with all the powers and duties of a guardian
until the child reached the age of fourteen years. The child was per-
mitted, when he became fourteen, to select a guardian of his own
choice subject to the court's approval. The "society" had the power
during the period of guardianship to receive from the child's parents
a release of parental rights in the form of an acknowledged deed duly
recorded as in the case of conveyances of real estate. Such a release
deprived the parents of the right to custody and control of the child.
An additional provision of this legislation is worthy of note. The
probate court was authorized to take a child and deliver it to the
custody of a "society" without notice or hearing upon the verified
application of a society that the child was suffering from "neglect or
ill-treatment." The child could remain in the custody of the society
for not more than thirty days, during which time formal proceedings
could be instituted under the other provisions of the act.18
These laws establishing a statutory form of dual adoption remained
in force until 1917 when they were repealed, and a code for the adop-
tion of children was enacted vesting jurisdiction over adoption in the
juvenile division of the circuit court. 9
The laws of 189720 gave the county court the power to award the
custody of a minor child of "habitually intemperate or inhuman" or
"grossly immoral" parents to some person or to a non-sectarian in-
stitution for care and education. The county court was authorized to
award a reasonable amount out of the county's pauper funds for the
support of such a child.
15. MO. REV. STAT. § 602 (1879).
16. Eleemosynary: Abandoned, Ill-Treated and Friendless Children. Mo. Laws
1889, at 116.
17. Id. at 117.
18. Ibid.
19. Mo. Laws 1917, at 193.
20. Mo. Laws 1897, at 75; Mo. REv. STAT. § 5251 (1899).
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CRIMINAL COURTS AND MINORS
Nineteenth century attitudes in Missouri toward punishment of
children convicted of crime are graphically illustrated in the decisions
of our courts. In State v. Barton, 1 a boy not yet sixteen years old at
the time of his alleged crime was convicted of murder in the first de-
gree and sentenced to death. One of the grounds for appeal was the
refusal of the trial court to sentence the defendant to imprisonment
in the county jail because he was under sixteen at the time of com-
mitting the murder. The defendant relied on an 1865 statute which
read: "Whenever any person under the age of sixteen years shall be
convicted of any felony, he shall be sentenced to imprisonment in a
county jail, not exceeding one year, instead of imprisonment in the
penitentiary .... -12 The supreme court held:
This section seems capable of but one construction, and that is to
require imprisonment in a county jail as a substitute for impris-
onment in the penitentiary, where such offenses as were punish-
able by imprisonment in the penitentiary have been committed
by a youth under sixteen. A felony punishable by death is not
within the letter or meaning of the statute. The judgment must
be affirmed. 3
The statute referred to by the court in the Barton case is also found
in the Revised Statutes of 1879 with the exception that by express
provision it is applicable to persons convicted of a felony committed
when under eighteen years of age.2 - In 1887 this law was amended
and again made applicable to persons under sixteen years of age.2 5
However, the court was given the power, if the defendant was over
sixteen and under eighteen, to commute the imprisonment from the
penitentiary to the county jail for a term of not more than one year,
if, in the courts opinion, the facts warranted it. The governor was
also empowered to commute a death sentence imposed on a minor un-
der eighteen years to imprisonment in the penitentiary for not less
than two years. This bit of legislation had an emergency clause
phrased in the following ominous language: "There being cases of
convictions now pending, in which the action of the governor is
sought, creates an emergency within the meaning of the constitution;
therefore, this act shall take effect and be in force from and after
passage."'2 ,
In the Revised Statutes of 1899 there was a provision for the sen-
tencing of a minor, convicted of a felony committed while under six-
teen, to a "reformatory school" for one year or over or until he
21. 71 Mo. 288 (1879).
22. Mo. GEN. STAT. § 21 (1865).
23. State v. Barton, 71 Mo. 288, 290 (1879).
24. Mo. Ruv. STAT. § 1666 (1879).
25. Mo. Laws 1887, at 166.
26. Ibid.
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becomes twenty-one, or to imprisonment in the county jail for not
more than one year, in place of confinement in the penitentiary. As
to minors over sixteen and under eighteen, the court could com-
mute a penitentiary sentence to the reformatory or county jail in the
same manner. The governor retained the power to commute the death
penalty imposed on a minor under eighteen to imprisonment in the
penitentiary for not less than two years.2 7
The supreme court in 1882 recognized the common-law principle 2
of criminal intent applicable to infants. In State v. Adams,2D the court
considered the appeal of a boy, twelve years old at the time of the
trial, who was convicted of murder in the first degree. The judgment
was reversed because the state's instructions "virtually told the jury
that defendant's age should not affect the conclusion at which they
should arrive, any more than if he had been of mature years."80 This
was held error. The court decreed that the law presumes the infant
doli incapax (incapable of criminal intention) between the ages of
seven and fourteen, and this presumption must be overcome by the
state with "evidence strong and clear beyond all doubt and contradic-
tion."3 1 After the Adams decision the supreme court recognized the
common-law principle that an infant under seven years of age cannot
be guilty of a felony.32
In 1897 the legislature enacted a law authorizing judges of the
circuit and criminal courts to release on parole (a) any offender sen-
tenced to a fine or jail term, or (b) any person under the age of
twenty-five convicted of a felony other than murder, rape, arson, or
robbery, or (c) any person confined in jail.33
There is no doubt that the differential treatment of children in the
criminal courts of Missouri with respect to (1) age distinctions and
criminal responsibility, (2) commutation of penitentiary sentences to
the county jail for a limited term, or to a "reformatory school," and
(3) the establishment by statute of the power of the criminal court
to parole offenders under the age of twenty-five convicted of certain
felonies, had a part in the eventual development of the present system
of juvenile court laws.
The use in Missouri of specialized institutions for minors, a vitally
important factor in the proper functioning of the modern juvenile
court, had its starting point when the legislature in 1889 formally
27. Mo. REv. STAT. § 2381 (1899).
28. 2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *464-65.
29. 76 Mo. 355 (1882).
30. Id. at 357.
31. Ibid.
32. State v. Tice, 90 Mo. 112, 2 S.W. 269 (1886).
33. Mo. Laws 1897, at 71.
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declared that the Reform School for Boys at Boonville 34 and the In-
dustrial Home for Girls at Chillicothe were to be eleemosynary insti-
tutions of the state .3 The management of each institution was vested
in separate five-member boards .3  These two institutions were the
forerunners of the present Training School for Boys at Boonville and
the Chillicothe Training School for Girls.
THE BEGINNING OF THE MODERN JUVENILE COURT
It is apparent that the law in the nineteenth century had not yet
conceived of even a formal "horizontal" method of action in the
handling of minors who came into the courts whether by their own
immediate acts or as a result of the fault of their parents. Children
were subject to "vertical" handling by equity courts, probate courts,
justices of the peace, county courts, and even by formal deeds. Yet,
near the end of the century, we find what is generally conceded to be
the first definite step in the direction away from this hodge-podge
treatment of children. The pioneering work of the Chicago Bar As-
sociation, under the leadership of Judge Harvey B. Hurd, with the aid
of Dr. Hastings H. Hart, Director of the Illinois Children's Home and
Aid Society, and the Chicago Women's Club, among many others, re-
suited in the adoption by the Illinois legislature on April 21, 1899, of
an act entitled "Juvenile Courts, for Dependent, Neglected and Delin-
quent Children. '37 This act established a "special court room to be
designated as the Juvenile Court Room" and vested the judicial ad-
ministration of the law in the circuit court (or its Illinois equivalent).
The law applied to children under the age of sixteen who were de-
pendent, neglected, or delinquent. Dependent and neglected children
were defined as those who were destitute, homeless, abandoned, and
dependent upon the public for support, or those children not receiving
proper parental care, or whose home was an unfit place for children.
A delinquent child was defined as one who had violated a state law
or a municipal ordinance. Nearly all criminal procedure was elim-
inated. Proceedings for neglect and delinquency were instituted by
the filing of a petition by a resident; thus, the arrest of the child was
eliminated. The court was authorized to "hear and dispose of the case
in a summary manner." Any interested person or the judge on his own
motion could demand a jury of six "to try the case." The law also
established the office of probation officer with duties similar to those
contained in later Missouri acts, but in this original Illinois statute
the probation officer was "to receive no compensation from the public
34. In 1903 the name was changed to "The Missouri Training School for Boys."
Mo. Laws 1903, at 202.
35. Mo. Laws 1889, at 112.
36. Ibid.
37. Ill. Laws 1899, at 131.
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treasury."38 Children under twelve years of age were not to be com-
mitted to any jail. Any child found guilty of a criminal offense could
be committed to any institution in the county incorporated for the
care of delinquent children, to the state reformatory, to the care and
guardianship of the probation officer, or to a foster home; or the child
could be returned to his own home and remain under the supervision
of the probation officer. The purpose of the act was set out in the fol-
lowing words: "That the care, custody and discipline of a child shall
approximate as nearly as may be that which should be given by its
parents, and in all cases where it can properly be done the child be
placed in an improved family home and become a member of the fam-
ily by legal adoption or otherwise, ' 39 and to this end the act was to be
liberally construed.
At about the same time, Ben Lindsey and his group of supporters
persuaded the Colorado legislature to amend the existing "School
Law" (April 12, 1899), relating to children between the ages of eight
and eighteen who were habitual truants, vicious, immoral, etc. As a
result Lindsey independently organized a limited juvenile court. But
it was not until 1903 that Colorado, by law, established juvenile
courts.
40
1901 PROBATION ACT
What appears to be the first positive legislation in Missouri in the
general direction of our modern conception of juvenile court legisla-
tion was enacted by the legislature in 1901. This particular statute
was captioned "CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS: PROBATION FOR JU-
VENILE DELINQUENTS" and was applicable only to cities of 350,000 in-
habitants or more.4'
The 1901 act provided for the appointment of an officer to be known
as a probation officer with power to appoint deputy probation officers,
all subject to court approval. It was the duty of the probation officer
to investigate the "social environments, past conduct and general
character of any child under sixteen years of age as soon as practica-
ble after the child's arrest, or violation of any state law or municipal
ordinance, 4 2 and to submit such information in writing to the court
having jurisdiction of the offense and child. The probation officer
was required to attend the trial of the child, represent him, and super-
vise his conduct as the court might direct "with power to visit said
child from time to time as its interests and the interests of society
38. A concession for obvious political expediency which was corrected in 1905
by legislation authorizing compensation in the proper manner. See Ill. Laws 1905,
at 151-52.
39. Ill. Laws 1899, at 137.
40. Colo. Laws 1903, at 187.
41. Mo. Laws 1901, at 135.
42. Ibid.
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may demand, in the opinion of the court or of said probation officer. '43
Police officers arresting children under sixteen years of age were re-
quired to inform the probation officer immediately and give him all
available information pertaining to the child. After the arrest, the
court was authorized to release the child on bond or upon his own
recognizance or to commit him to the custody of his parents or other
suitable person until the trial. After trial or "a hearing of the cause,"
the court could defer entering judgment and commit the child to
his parents, guardian, or other suitable custodian subject to the
supervision of the probation officer. The court could enter judgment
and stay execution, Ithen order the child placed in the manner above
described. If the conduct of the child was satisfactory, the court could
set aside the judgment or stay execution "altogether." The court had
discretion to commit a child found guilty of the violation of any law
or ordinance to any state institution, training school for boys, in-
dustrial school for girls, or any institution incorporated under Mis-
souri laws for the care of children consistent with the laws, rules, and
regulations of such institutions. Jailers were required, "as far as
practicable," to provide places of confinement for children under six-
teen separate from other prisoners. The probation officer was re-
quired to keep full records of all cases handled by his office. The sal-
ary of the probation officer was established at $800 per annum with
his assistant's salary fixed at a maximum of $600 per year and an
expense allowance not exceeding $100 a year. The prosecuting at-
torney was directed to give the probation officers aid in the perform-
ance of their duties "consistent with their official relation to said
cases."
It is noted that, although the probation statute contained certain
features of the juvenile court statutes as we know them today, it did
not embrace the fundamental concept that children who violate crimi-
nal laws are wards of the state in special need of the state's care, pro-
tection, and treatment, and are not to be treated as criminals. Chil-
dren in Missouri were still indicted and tried for specific crimes in the
criminal courts under the rules applicable to the criminal trial of
adults. However, the 1901 act represents an attempt at co-ordination
of institutional facilities, foster homes, social agency resources, and
the suspension-of-sentence power of the criminal courts in its applica-
tion to children under sixteen years of age.
4:1. Ibid.
44. Suspension of sentence and probation was apparently initiated by John
Augustus in the courts of Boston in 1841. In 1878 Massachusetts adopted this
procedure by statute applicable to both minors and children. It was the 1901
Probation Act that adopted this procedure for Missouri, limited to children under
the age of sixteen in cities with 350,000 inhabitants or more.
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1903 JUVENILE COURTS ACT
In 1903 the probation act was repealed and the legislature enacted
the first set of laws under the title "JUVENILE COURTS ESTAB-
LISHED. AN ACT to regulate the treatment and control of neglected
and delinquent children in counties having a population of 150,000 in-
habitants and over."4 5 The 1903 act was applicable only to children
under the age of sixteen years and related specifically to the legislative
definition of "neglected child" and "delinquent child." The statute
adopted in substance the definition of minors subject to be "bound
out" by the probate court under the terms of the Laws of 1825,40 plus
the definition of "neglected children" subject, under the terms of the
Laws of 1889,47 to removal from their parents by the probate court
and their being placed under the guardianship of a "society." "De-
linquent child" was defined as one who violates any law of the state, or
city ordinance, which is the same group affected by the 1901 Probation
Act.
The 1903 Juvenile Courts Act provided, for the first time in Mis-
souri, a "Juvenile Court Room" and a "Juvenile Court." The circuit
court was vested with original jurisdiction of all cases coming within
the terms of the act. That court was directed to designate one of its
judges to hear all cases under the act; he thereby became judge of the
new juvenile court.
Practice and procedure in criminal cases were to apply in the ju-
venile court to the extent applicable unless otherwise provided, and,
in all trials under the act, "any person interested therein may demand
a trial by jury." Neglect proceedings were to be heard by the court in
a "summary manner."
The office of probation officer was established with powers and
duties similar to those under the 1901 act. The probation officer was
appointed by the circuit court, and he, in turn, could appoint deputy
probation officers.
The act specifically prohibited a justice of the peace, police magis-
trate, or judge of any court having jurisdiction of the "offense" from
trying a child under the age of sixteen years. Exclusive jurisdiction
was vested in the juvenile court, which was directed to "proceed to
hear the case in accordance with the law, in trials of such offenses. ' 4
Summons requiring the appearance of the child in court could be is-
sued in lieu of an arrest warrant.
Imposition of punishment and penalties imposed by law for the
commission of offenses under this act rested in the discretion of the
45. Mo. Laws 1903, at 213.
46. Mo. Laws 1825, at 132.
47. Mo. Laws. 1889, at 116.
48. Mo. Laws 1903, at 215.
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judge of the juvenile court, who could suspend or remit the execution
of any sentence. A substantially similar provision was contained in
the 1901 act.
The court was authorized to cause investigations to be made of the
cases in the court, and for this purpose could adjourn the hearing
from time to time. Under the terms of the 1903 act (unlike the 1901
act) the child could not be committed to a jail (whether or not practi-
cable), but was to be kept in a suitable place provided by the county
or with an association which cared for neglected children. When a
delinquent child was sentenced to confinement in an institution in
which adult convicts were kept, it was declared unlawful to keep the
child in the same building or yard as adults, and any contact between
them was prohibited. A similar provision in the 1901 act required
this segregation only so far as "practicable."
Prosecuting officials were directed to aid the probation officers in
the performance of their duties, and police officers were required to
inform the probation officer of the arrest of any child under sixteen.
This provision was generally covered in the 1901 act.
Salaries of the probation officer and his deputies were increased
$200 per annum to $1,000 and $800 respectively, with allowable ex-
penses remaining the same.
The court's power to deal with and place the child was quite similar
to the 1901 provisions. For the first time, however, there appeared a
requirement that, in committing delinquent children to the care and
custody of an individual or association, consideration must be given
to the religious beliefs of the persons involved. Also new was the pro-
vision permitting the juvenile court to enter an order requiring the
parents of the neglected or delinquent child to contribute to his sup-
port when the court found they were able to do so.
The act of 1903, although enacted in March 1903, came under judi-
cial scrutiny by the supreme court, en banc, in an opinion handed
down in December 1903.1 ' The proceedings presented but one ques-
tion for the court's consideration and that was the validity of the 1903
Juvenile Courts Act. First, the validity of the act was questioned be-
cause the title described it as one to regulate the treatment and con-
trol of neglected and delinquent children. It was charged that "neg-
lected and delinquent" described two classes of subjects in violation
of a constitutional prohibition against a bill containing more than one
subject. The court determined that the term "neglected and delin-
quent children," though referring to two classes, does not refer to
classes of different subjects; that there is but one subject, "children,"
and "neglected and delinquent" indicated the classes or character of
children treated in the body of the act.
49. Ex parte Loving, 178 Mo. 194, 77 S.W. 508 (1903).
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The second objection to the validity of the act concerned the fact
that it was applicable to children in counties having a population of
150,000 and over. It was conceded that at the time of its passage
(and when it was considered by the court) it was applicable only to
the City of St. Louis (by express provision in the act, the City of St.
Louis was deemed a county within the meaning of the act) and to
Jackson County, as no other county in the state at that time had a
population of 150,000 or over. This being so, it was contended that
the act violated the constitutional prohibition against local or special
laws. The court held, however, that there was greater need for the
juvenile court in densely populated areas than in rural communities,
and the legislature was justified in making the law applicable only to
urban areas.
The court also denied the validity of a third objection to the act,
namely, that it did not provide for the separation of the neglected
child from the delinquent child. The court held in effect that such
objection was directed to a defect in detail only, not of power, and
that such a defect could be obviated in time by amendment of the act.
In holding the act to be a valid exercise of the legislative power
under the Missouri Constitution, the court made the following obser-
vations:
This is a new law, going out into a comparatively new field of
legislation, and it cannot and must not be expected that it would
be complete in all the minor details, for its enforcement, but these
imperfections can not be made the basis of attack on its constitu-
tionality.
The Legislature doubtless felt that the conditions surrounding
the children in large cities, the temptations that daily beset them,
the increased danger of such surroundings, justified the distinc-
tion made, in the application of this act, and being a co-ordinate
branch of the government, due respect should be given the judg-
ment of this branch of the State government, as to whether or not
such conditions surrounded the subject of legislation as to author-
ize and justify the distinguishing features of the act before us.
We are dealing not only with a delicate and tender subject, but
also an important one. Every good citizen feels a deep interest
in the betterment of the condition of the children of this State;
we can not be unmindful that the perpetuity of good government
must depend upon the care and attention given those into whose
hands it must eventually fall. Hence, it is not only our duty, but
in perfect accord with the instincts of a good heart, to imitate the
example of our Divine Savior, in manifesting, on all occasions,
our interest in this subject, as He did, in the announcement to
His disciples, "Suffer little children to come unto me, and forbid
them not, for of such is the kingdom of God."
We have thus given expression to our views upon the questions
involved in this proceeding. We have reached the conclusion that
the act before us is a valid exercise of the legislative power, un-
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der the Constitution of this State. While this conclusion is
reached, the question as to the constitutionality of this act is not
without doubt; but following the well-settled doctrine upon this
subject, all reasonable doubts must be resolved in favor of the
validity of the act. This we have done in this case.
We highly commend the spirit manifested by members of the
bar in the presentation of the questions involved. It was simply a
legal proposition, discussed upon a high plane, and for the sole
and unselfish purpose of obtaining a judicial expression upon the
validity of an act in which the public has a deep interest.
We have declared the act valid. Its proper and successful en-
forcement depends largely upon the people and upon the conduct
of the legal profession of the cities and counties to which it ap-
plies. If its provisions are enforced with the same spirit that has
prevailed in the submission and discussion of the question in-
volved, then there is no longer any doubt as to the benefits to be
derived from this act by the children, their parents, and the
public.5*
The act of 1903 was again considered by the supreme court in a
1906 opinion in State ex rel. Clarke v. Wilder."' The question involved
was whether or not the state was liable for costs in a case involving
a defendant under sixteen years of age who was charged with murder.
The defendant, because of his age, "was arraigned in the Juvenile
Court of the Cit, of St. Louis, Missouri, pleaded not guilty, was tried
by the jury, and was acquitted."2 The court, in concluding that there
should be no distinction between trials in the juvenile court and those
in the criminal court, said:
We not only do not discover any irreconcilable conflict between
the Juvenile Court act and the general statute as to the trial and
punishment of "delinquent" children, but the Juvenile Court act
on its face, we think, intends to preserve the procedure and gen-
eral statutes in regard to the prosecution of minors under six-teenjust as it was before that act, with the exception that it confers
the exclusive jurisdiction upon the circuit court and gives it a
wide discretion as to the punishment of said minors and the fore-
going of all punishment under certain conditions.5 3
THE 1905 ACT
In 1905 the legislature repealed the 1903 Juvenile Courts Act inso-
far as it applied to counties having less than 500,000 inhabitants and
passed an act entitled "CHILDREN: NEGLECTED AND DELINQUENT.
AN ACT to regulate the treatment and control of neglected and de-
linquent children, and to provide necessary places of detention there-
for, in counties having a population of one hundred and fifty thou-
sand and less than five hundred thousand inhabitants.... .,54
50. Id. at 220-21, 77 S.W. at 515.
51. 197 Mo. 27, 94 S.W. 499 (1906).
52. Id. at 31, 94 S.W. at 499.
53. Id. at 35, 94 S.W. at 501.
54. Mo. Laws 1905, at 56.
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The following new matters were included in the 1905 act:
1. The act applied to children "sixteen (16) years of age or under"
rather than children "under the age of sixteen years."
2. The juvenile court was authorized to inflict punishment extend-
ing beyond the age of majority "in cases where the delinquent shall be
convicted of a crime" for which the punishment, when such crime is
committed by persons over eighteen, is death, or imprisonment in the
penitentiary for not less than ten years.
3. The definition of "delinquent child" was extended to include viola-
tions of village ordinances, in addition to the violations of state laws
and city ordinances previously covered. The definition was also ex-
panded to take in an entirely new category, including incorrigibility,
bad associates, visiting saloon or pool room, the habitual use of vile
language, immoral conduct in a public place, etc., which is substan-
tially similar to the present statutory definition.55
4. For the first time, the law declared that any child committing any
of the acts described under the definition of "delinquent child" shall be
"deemed a juvenile delinquent person, and shall be proceeded against
as such in the manner hereinafter provided."'56 (The 1903 act, which
had defined a "delinquent child as one who violates a state law or city
ordinance," simply gave the juvenile court discretion to stay execution
of all penalties imposed by statute or ordinance for violation thereof.)
The juvenile court, in addition to its power to stay execution of all
penalties imposed by law, was now specifically authorized, for the first
time, to commit a delinquent child to the Missouri Training School for
Boys or to the State Industrial School for Girls; this power had been
given to the juvenile court by implication in sections 13 and 18 of the
1903 act.57
5. The disposition of a delinquent child and the evidence in such
case were made unlawful and improper evidence against such child
in any other court.
6. Probation officers were vested with the power and authority of
sheriffs to make arrests and perform other duties incident to their
office.
7. The salary of the probation officer was increased from $1,000 to
$1,200 per annum and that of his deputies from a maximum of $800
to $900 per annum and allowable expenses were increased from a
maximum of $100 to $200 a year.
8. The duty of the county to provide a place of detention for chil-
dren was specifically stated. (This had only been implied in the 1903
act.8 8)
55. Mo. REv. STAT. § 211.010-3 (1949).
56. Mo. Laws 1905, at 57.
57. See Mo. Laws 1903, at 216-17.
58. See Mo. Laws 1903, at 215.
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9. The act prohibited the confinement of any child fourteen years
of age or under in a common jail, and provided that any violation of
this prohibition was punishable by contempt proceedings. (This pro-
vision was in addition to the prohibition against confining delinquent
children with adult convicts, a provision contained in both the 1903
and 1905 acts.)
10. Section 22 of the 1905 act provided:
This act shall be liberally construed to the end that its pur-
poses may be carried out, to-wit, that the care, custody and disci-
pline of the child shall approximate as nearly as may be that
which should be given by its parents; and that as far as practi-
cable any delinquent child shall be treated, not as a criminal, but
as misdirected and misguided, and needing aid, encouragement,
help and assistance.5"
THE 1909 ACT
In 1909 the legislature repealed both the 1903 act (which, after the
passage of the 1905 act, was applicable only to counties having 500,000
inhabitants or more) and the 1905 act, and enacted a law captioned
"COURTS OF RECORD, JUVENILE: To Regulate Treatment and
Control of Delinquent Children in Counties Over 50,000 Population. ' ' 30
There appears to be no substantial departure from the language of the
1905 act, but the following additions and changes should be noted:
1. A neglected child could be placed in a public hospital or institu-
tion for treatment or care, or in a private hospital or institution by
the court if no charge was made.
2. The minimum age for probation officers and deputies was set at
twenty-five. The salary of the probation officer was increased from
$1,200 per annum to $2,500 in counties of 200,000 and over, and was
set at $1,500 in counties having a population between 100,000 and
200,000, and at $1,000 in counties with populations from 50,000 to
100,000. Deputy probation officers, who under the 1905 act had a
maximum salary of $900 per annum, were given an increase to maxi-
mums of $1,500 in the larger counties, $1,000 in the middle group of
counties, but suffered a decrease to $800 in the less populated counties.
Allowable expenses remained at the $200 per annum maximum.
3. The larger counties, those with a population of 200,000 and more,
were authorized to have both a superintendent and matron in charge
of the detention home, who were to receive maximum annual salaries
of $1,800 and $1,200 respectively.
4. Probation officers, deputy probation officers, and persons in
charge of the detention home were to be appointed on the basis of
merit after competitive examinations in accordance with rules of the
circuit court.
59. Mo. Laws 1905, at 61.
60. Mo. Laws 1909, at 423.
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5. The penalty for confining a child fourteen years old or younger
in a common jail was' changed to a misdemeanor instead of punish-
ment by contempt, as provided in the 1905 act.
6. The juvenile court was specifically authorized to commit a neg-
lected or delinquent child also found to be feeble-minded or epileptic
to an institution "conformable to the laws governing said institution."
THE 1911 ACT
The 1911 act,61 styled "COURTS OF RECORD: Juvenile Courts in
Certain Counties Having A Population of 50,000 Inhabitants and
Over," repealed the 1909 act and is substantially the body of the law
under which juvenile courts operate today in class one and tvo coun-
ties.
The 1911 act made some significant changes over the 1909 act which
are here set out:
1. The application of practice and procedure in criminal cases and
the right to demand a trial by jury contained in the prior acts were
now limited to those cases in which the child was charged with the
violation of the criminal statutes of the state. In all other proceedings
under the act the trial was before the court without a jury, and equity
practice and procedure was to govern.
2. The twenty-five year old age limit for deputy probation officers
was eliminated.
3. Places of detention were to provide care for children which was
to approximate as closely as possible the care of children in good
homes.
4. The court was authorized to approve the expenditure of county,
funds for the necessary support of a neglected or delinquent child.
The constitutionality of the 1911 act was tested in a proceeding
brought by a minor charged with rape and delinquency who sought a
writ prohibiting the judge of the juvenile court from proceeding with
the case.2 The minor urged that the act was violative of the state
and federal constitutions in that it "attempts to prescribe a summary
procedure punishing crimes without providing for indictment, proper
information, counsel for the accused, arraignment, bail, jury trial
(except on demand), public trial, compulsory process for witnesses."' 3
As an outgrowth of this proceeding, the supreme court, en bane, in
an opinion written by Judge Blair, announced the legal principles
applicable to the trial of juveniles charged with delinquency in the
juvenile court which have permitted that court to develop along the
path most beneficial to the state and the children brought before the
61. Mo. Laws 1911, at 177.
62. State ex 'el. Matacia v. Buckner, 300 Mo. 359, 254 S.W. 179 (1923).
63. Id. at 364, 254 S.W. at 180.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1957/iss1/7
THE JUVENILE COURT CONCEPT IN MISSOURI
court. Judge Blair recognized that there is language in the act which
gives color to the charge that it authorizes trial and punishment for
crime,-'' and that a child being tried with a view to his conviction and
punishment for the crime itself is entitled to invoke all the constitu-
tional safeguards applicable to a criminal trial. The court, however,
pointed out that the principal, if not sole, purpose of the 1911 act
[I]s not trial and punishment for crime, but the protection and
support of neglected children and the reformation of delinquent
children. It is well settled that in the case of delinquent children
the State has the power in proper circumstances to take over
their custody in order to insure their security, training and
reformation.... The power exerted by the State, parens patriae,
is asserted in its right to supply proper custody and care in lieu
of that of which neglected and delinquent children are deprived.6
The opinion declared that a proceeding under the juvenile laws is
the exercise of the state's power, parens patriae, for the reformation
of a child and not for his punishment under the criminal law. There-
fore, such a proceeding is not a criminal case and the constitutional
guarantees protecting defendants in criminal cases are not applicable.
C I. The court was referring to § 2 of Mo. Laws 1911, at 180 which provides:
The practice and procedure prescribed by law for the conduct of criminal
eases shall govern in all proceedings under this act in which the child stands
charged with the violation of the criminal statutes of the state and in such
p? ceedings the child, his parent, or any person standing in loco parentis
to him may on his behalf demand a trial by jury.
This appears to be an anachronism in the law which intermingles criminal juris-
diction with the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. Since the jurisdiction of thejuvenile court was not exclusive (only original, Mo. Laws 1911, at 179; Mo. Ruv.
Sr AT. § 211.020 (1949)), it would seem to follow that the criminal court could
secure jurisdiction at its option if the child were charged by indictment or in-
formation with the violation of the criminal statutes of the state. The provision
above quoted might be interpreted as authorizing the juvenile court to try .
juve)ile, accused of delinquency by reason of violating the criminal statutes of
the state, before a jury under the rules of criminal procedure. State ex rel.
Shartel v. Trimble, 333 Mo. 888, 63 S.W.2d 37, 39 (1933).
Some of the confusion resulting from the inclusion of the above provision in
the juvnile court laws was removed by Mo. Laws 1927, at 129; Mo. REV. STAT. §
211.520 (1949), which authorized the juvenile court judge to dismiss any petition
alleging a child to be delinquent and thereupon such child could be prosecuted
under the "general law." This, of course, could only apply to children charged
with violation of a state law. The original provision considered by Judge Blair
remaings in the juvenile court laws and its application continues to be vague.
The confusion resulting from this provision can be traced through the opinions
in State ex rel. Boyd v. Rutledge, 321 lo. 1090, 13 S.W.2d 1061 (1928); State
ex r' l. Wells v. Walker, 326 Mo. 1233, 34 S.W.2d 124 (1930); Ex parte Bass,
328 Mo. 195, 40 S.W.2d 457 (1931); and, finally, State ex rel. MacNish v. Land-
webr, 332 Mo. 622, 60 S.W.2d 4, 8 (1932). This latter decision disposes of the
entire controversy by pointing out that there is in fact no Juvenile Court, that
"Juvenile Court" is a term of convenience only ("and the court may for con-
venience be called the juvenile court," Mo. Rm. STAT. § 211.020 (1949)); that
by statute the circuit court has original jurisdiction of all cases arising under
the * ivenile laws and likewise has crininal jurisdiction, and that court rules
providing for the assignment of cases to criminal divisions or domestic relations
divisions (which by court rule includes causes arising under the "Juvenile Court
Laws") are for convenience but do not affect the question of jurisdiction.
65. State ex rel. Matacia v. Buckner, 300 Mo. 359, 365, 254 S.W. 179, 180
(1923).
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Further, the opinion clarified the distinction between a charge of
crime and a charge of delinquency by reason of crime in the following
language:
In this case the alleged criminal act.., is not set up as a charge
of crime and a predicate of punishment under the criminal law
but merely as the thing which brings relator within the definition
of "delinquent children" in the act and shows he is within the
class over which the State is authorized to exert its power of
quasi-parental control.66
.... Under the statute relator is a delinquent child if he has com-
mitted rape. The charge is that he is a delinquent child, and the
proof of it is alleged to be that he is guilty of rape. It is not
sought to punish him as a rapist, but to reform him from his
state of delinquency. 7
The supreme court thereupon dismissed the application for the writ
of prohibition, thus permitting the juvenile court to proceed with the
hearing on the charge of delinquency.
The principle that a proceeding brought against a child alleged to
be delinquent is an exercise of the state's power as parens patriae for
the reformation of the child and not for punishment as in criminal
proceedings, and that constitutional guarantees respecting a defend-
ant in a criminal case do not apply in a delinquency case, has been
reaffirmed by the supreme court.68
PROPOSED JUVENILE COURT LEGISLATION
The growing recognition of the need for specialized supervision,
guidance, and treatment for children displaying unacceptable social
behavior has been the most important single factor in the develop-
ment of the juvenile court. Although this may be considered at first
glance a radical change in the direction of our law, yet it is well recog-
nized that one of the basic factors of the Anglo-Saxon heritage of
common law is that it is a living body of law which ultimately re-
sponds to the social and human needs of the people who live by it.
These changes need not be evolutionary in character but may arise
from legislation which has given direction to our social developmentOD
The departure from criminal procedure in the handling of juveniles
was a substantial obstacle which had to be met. Since the first ju-
venile court act in 1903 this matter had been a troublesome one in the
decisions of the courts. Criminal procedure now has been definitely
66. Id. at 366, 254 S.W. at 181.
67. Id. at 368, 254 S.W. at 182.
68. State v. Harold, 364 Mo. 1052, 271 S.W.2d 527 (1954); State v. Heath, 352
Mo. 1147, 181 S.W.2d 517 (1944); Ex parte Naccarat, 328 Mo. 722, 41 S.W.2d
176 (1931).
69. State ex rel. Schlueter Mfg. Co. v. Beck, 337 Mo. 839, 848, 85 S.W.2d
1026, 1030 (1935).
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removed from the area of the juvenile court by court decisions. There
remains the task of enacting legislation which gives proper recogni-
tion to this development and the implementation of the juvenile court
with such facilities as may be necessary to accomplish its proper
purposes.
A Joint Committee on Juvenile Delinquency of the Sixty-eighth
Missouri General Assembly has drafted proposed legislation that will
accomplish much in the direction of absorbing into statute law the
substantial progress that has been made in Missouri in the handling
and treatment of juveniles brought before the juvenile court. This
draft has been incorporated into a senate bill70 which is currently
before the Sixty-ninth General Assembly, and appears as an appendix
to this article. The bill indicates that the committee is not only giving
recognition to the progress that has been made since the 1911 act, but
is also attempting to give to the juvenile court those tools that are so
essential for it to accomplish its proper purposes. The proposed act
falls into the following general subdivisions :71
General Purpose and Definitions
Jurisdiction
Procedure
Apprehension and Detention
Hearing and Decree
Juvenile Officers and Services
General
General Purpose and Definitions
The proposed juvenile court law for Missouri generally seeks to
consolidate two sets of such laws (one applicable to class one and two
counties and the other applicable to class three and four counties) into
one act applying to all counties alike insofar as it appears possible
to do so. It also represents an effort to profit by the experiences of the
courts in recognizing that the basic philosophy of the juvenile court
is the protection and support of neglected children and the reforma-
tion of delinquent children.
The general purpose section,7- although more explicit than the pres-
ent section," lacks the specific direction contained in the present sec-
tion that a delinquent child shall not be treated as a criminal.
The definition section4 increases the age of those persons subject to
70. SENATE BILL No. 15, 69th Missouri General Assembly (first read January
7, 1957).
71. References to sections of the proposed act will be indicated by "Proposed
Act" followed by the section number used in the senate bill (ibid.). References
to the present law will be by section number as found in Mo. REV. STAT. (1949).
72. Proposed Act § 211.010.
73. Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.180 (1949).
74. Proposed Act § 211.020-2.
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the jurisdiction of the juvenile court from children under the age of
seventeen years7 5 to those under eighteen years of age. This makes
the jurisdiction of the Missouri courts over juveniles the same as that
now existing in thirty-one other states. The proposed section also
confines jurisdiction over juveniles to circuit courts,7 6 thereby elimi-
nating from this field the magistrate court in counties with a popula-
tion less than 70,000.77
Jurisdiction
The jurisdiction section" represents, in many of its aspects, long-
needed clarification and modernization of the definition of the children
who are subject to the juvenile court jurisdiction. It establishes the
jurisdiction of the court as not only original but exclusive, thus doing
away with even the possibility of the criminal court's jurisdiction
being exercised in the first instance. It ends the use of the judicial
finding of "neglected" and "delinquent" to predicate jurisdiction and
establishes in its place the proper basis for jurisdiction, to wit, the
need of the child for care and treatment resulting from (a) parental
neglect or refusal to provide proper support, education, and medical
care, (b) behavior, environment, or association of the child that is in-
jurious to his welfare or the welfare of others, or (c) violation by the
child of a state law or municipal ordinance. The proposed provision
also gives the court exclusive original jurisdiction in proceedings for
the suspension or revocation of a license to operate a motor vehicle.
Jurisdiction over adoptions is retained and there is a specific provision
authorizing the commitment of a child to the guardianship of the
Missouri State Department of Public Health and Welfare.
The obligation of a magistrate, police magistrate, or judge of any
other court to transfer juveniles and their cases immediately to the
juvenile court is restated.7 9 The time when the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court attaches is established at the point when the child is
taken into custody, 0 and proposed section 211.060 provides that the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court shall be continuing until a child's
twenty-first birthday, except for a child sent to the state board of
training schools. This latter section is significant because it eliminates
'the present provision81 which authorizes the juvenile court to inflict
punishment, extending beyond the twenty-first birthday, upon a child
convicted of a crime punishable by death or imprisonment for ten
years or more. It was this provision that implied there existed crimi-
75. Mo. REv. STAT. § 211.010 (1949).
76. Proposed Act § 211.020-3. The Cape Girardeau Court of Common Pleas is
also given jurisdiction.
77. Mo. CONST. art. V, § 20.
78. Proposed Act § 211.030.
79. Proposed Act § 211.050-2; Mo. Ruv. STAT. § 211.060 (1949).
80. Proposed Act § 211.130-3.
81. Mo. Rsv. STAT. § 211.010(1) (1949).
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nal jurisdiction in the juvenile courts and caused the appellate courts
so much difficulty. The non-criminal nature of juvenile court proceed-
ings is affirmatively stated in proposed section 211.270-2, which pro-
hibits charging or convicting a child of a crime unless the case is
transferred to a court of general jurisdiction.
Turning back to the existing laws, it should be noted that one of the
few additions to the 1911 act was section 211.52082 which did little to
eliminate the confusion concerning the prosecution of juveniles in the
criminal courts. It gave the juvenile court the right to dismiss a pend-
ing delinquency petition and permit the child to be prosecuted under
the "general law." But, it also authorized the criminal court to deny
a motion to transfer a case pending against any delinquent child, thus
implying the juvenile could be prosecuted, presumably when charged
with a crime, in the criminal court in the discretion of the judge of the
criminal court. Add to this the provisions of Mlo. REV. STAT. § 211.080
(1949) (211.350 in class three and four counties), which preserves
the right of other courts to file complaints and issue warrants for the
arrest of children although all subsequent proceedings are to be had
in the juvenile court, and the conflict is rather apparent.
The proposed section 211.070 contains no reference requiring a
motion to transfer to the juvenile court to be filed in a case pending in
the criminal court. It gives the juvenile court discretion to dismiss a
petition alleging a child fourteen years or older has committed an
offense which would be a felony if committed by an adult, so that such
child may be prosecuted under the general law. This action requires
a finding by the juvenile court that the child is not a proper subject to
be dealt with under the provisions of the juvenile court laws after the
court has heard evidence and has received the investigation report re-
quired by the act.
The proposed provision still leaves a gap between the order of the
juvenile court dismissing the petition and the institution of proceed-
ings in the criminal court which, it is submitted, should be closed. If
the juvenile court's jurisdiction terminates when it dismisses the
pending petition,D3 it cannot thereafter make any order affecting the
custody of the child pending the filing of charges in the criminal court.
Even upon the filing of the criminal charges the place where the child
can be detained has been a troublesome question. 84 This hiatus could
be eliminated by a provision authorizing the juvenile court to deter-
mine where the child should be held pending trial in the criminal
court.
82. Mo. Laws 1927, at 129; Mo. REN. STAT. § 211.520 (1949).
83. Ex parte Bass, 328 Mo. 195,40 S.W.2d 457 (1931).
84. See Mo. Rm. STAT. § 211.090 (4) (1949).
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P'ocedure
The procedure established under the proposed act reflects modern
attitudes toward the children brought before the juvenile court. The
1911 act, while providing for institution of neglect proceedings by any
resident filing a verified petition setting out the facts, 85 states that
delinquency proceedings may be started by an information or sworn
complaint filed by the city, prosecuting, or circuit attorney, as in cases
under the general law, or by the probation officer. 0 This method of
starting proceedings in the 1911 act is indicative of the influence
criminal procedure had on juvenile procedure.
Under the proposed act, section 211.080 would not only finally cut
off this vestige of criminal procedure but would also take a tremen-
dous step forward in making the proper functions and facilities of the
juvenile court available to many who could benefit thereby without
the social stigma that is sometimes attached to appearances in that
court. Under the proposed act, prosecuting officials are not author-
ized to institute juvenile court proceedings, and informations and
sworn complaints are eliminated. Only the juvenile officer is author-
ized to start the proceedings.
Of even greater significance is the provision authorizing the juve-
nile court to make a preliminary inquiry when any person informs the
court "in person and in writing that a child appears to be within the
purview of the applicable provisions of section 211.030 of this
act .... ,,s7 After this preliminary inquiry, the court may make "such
informal adjustment as is practicable." This is intended not only to
permit the court or its officers to investigate the complaint further,
but also to bring into operation any of its functions and facilities
which may be beneficial to the child, or to allow referral of the child to
some agency for treatment. In doing so the court may in many in-
stances, where no serious aspect of delinquency appears, obviate the
necessity for further proceedings under the law.
A proper use of this provision can be made in connection with the
diagnostic and treatment facilities that would be made available to
the court under the provisions of proposed section 211.180. It is felt
that such use is intended by this section, not only from its own word-
ing, but also when it is read in connection with proposed section 211.
130-3, which provides that the jurisdiction of the court "attaches"
when the child is taken into custody, and also with section 211.130-1,
which permits any child to be taken into custody who violates any law
or ordinance, or whose behavior, environment, or association is in-
85. Mo. REv. STAT. § 211.030 (1949).
86. Mo. REv. STAT. § 211.070 (1949).
87. Proposed Act § 211.080.
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jurious to his welfare or the welfare of others, or who is without
proper care, custody, or support.
If the informal adjustment thus authorized by the proposed act
achieves satisfactory results, further proceedings under the act be-
come unnecessary, thus permitting the disposition of many complaints
without a juvenile court "record" for the child. If a satisfactory re-
sult is not achieved, the court may authorize the filing of a petition by
the juvenile officer of the court.
The petition to be filed by the juvenile officer under the proposed
legislation is styled "In the interest of [Johnny Doe], a child under
eighteen years of age," rather than "State of Missouri v. John Doe."
The petition is to contain the facts which bring the child within the
court's jurisdiction, the full name, birth date, and residence of the
child, the names and residence of his living parents, legal guardian,
person having custody, or nearest known relative, and any other perti-
nent data."
Upon the filing of the petition, the child and the person having cus-
tody shall be summoned to appear before the court, unless they appear
voluntarily, and if the person having custody is someone other than
the parent or guardian, then the latter shall also be notified of the
pendency of the case and the time and place of the hearing. The court
may order the officer serving the summons to take the child into im-
mediate custody if the child's welfare requires such action.8 9 The sum-
mons must be served at least twenty-four hours before the time set
for the hearing.0 Proposed section 211.120 specifically authorizes the
juvenile court to punish for contempt a failure to obey the summons.
In view of the fact that the juvenile court as defined by proposed sec-
tion 211.020 is the circuit court of each county, this provision is a
proper and accurate restatement of the law.
Apprehension and Detention
The non-criminal nature of the juvenile court is continually re-
flected in the use of terminology and the elimination of procedures
applicable to arrests under the criminal laws. The proposed act spe-
cifically states that the taking of a child into custody is not to be con-
sidered an arrest.,' Parents are to be notified as soon as possible after
a child is taken into custody 2 The use of bail bonds appears to have
been eliminated, in fact, the child must be released to his parents un-
88. Proposed Act § 211.090.
89. Proposed Act § 211.100.
90. Proposed Act § 211.110.
91. Proposed Act § 211.130-1.
92. Proposed Act § 211.130-2.
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less the court, by its written order issued within twenty-four hours,
specifies the reason for detention.93
Proper detention of children pending the disposition of their cases
in the juvenile court has long been of prime importance in laws per-
taining to juveniles. As has been heretofore noted, the establishment
of places of detention by the county was provided for in the early
Missouri juvenile court laws. The proposed act provides an additional
detention facility in the form of foster homes. 4 One of the proposed
provisions permits a child's detention prior to hearing in a jail or
other facility used for adults, provided he is placed in a room or ward
separate from adults, in those cases in which the child's conduct is
such as to constitute a menace to himself or others.95 There may be
some question as to the wisdom of this provision, particularly in view
of the fact that few, if any, jails in the state have a "room or ward
entirely separate from adults confined therein." The possible im-
proper use of this new "facility" could well outweigh any advantage
that might be derived from it. It is well to remember that one of the
first steps in the differential treatment of children in the criminal
courts came about through the popular movement to separate con-
fined children from confined adults. There are many who undoubtedly
will consider this proposed provision a step backward. The need for
such confinement of children in jails, if it exists at all, is undoubtedly
restricted to isolated cases and could be avoided entirely by providing
proper facilities in the county's detention home. This section prohibits
the fingerprinting or photographing of children without the consent of
the juvenile court.98
The customary provision requiring the establishment of a detention
home recognizes the expansion of the court's facilities in that the
county has the duty to provide offices for the personnel of the juvenile
court.97 This is broader than the present phrase "offices for the Proba-
tion Officers"'98 and gives recognition to the potential contained in
proposed section 211.180. The proposed legislation provides that the
court, in addition to appointing a superintendent, assistants, or other
personnel for operating detention facilities, shall also establish the
amount of their compensation and maintenance. 9" This replaces the
present provision which fixes the salary of a superintendent at $1,800
:per annum and that of a matron at $1,200 per annum. The provision
93. Proposed Act § 211.140.
94. Proposed Act § 211.150.
95. Proposed Act § 211.150-4; Mo. Rzv. STAT. § 211.090(2) (1949) (This use
of the word "commit" in this latter section is confusing but we construe it to
mean pre-hearing confinement.).
96. Proposed Act § 211.150-2.
97. Proposed Act § 211.160-1.
98. M .REV. STAT. § 211.100 (1949).
99. Proposed Act § 211.360.
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also gives cognizance to the broadening of the facilities and treatment
required of the juvenile court.
Undoubtedly the most significant provision in the proposed law is
contained in section 211.180. One of the elements considered essential
for a juvenile court to become an effective tribunal operating for the
general welfare is the availability of sufficient facilities to insure that
the action of the court be based on the best available knowledge of the
needs of the child and that, if required, he receive care and treatment
from facilities adapted to his needs and administered by qualified per-
sons2 .... All delinquent children are not "sick children" in the sense
that they need medical or psychiatric care. However, it is vital that
all children who come in contact with the juvenile court be screened
by qualified persons to determine those who require psychiatric atten-
tion or other special medical services. Juvenile court officers, no mat-
ter how well trained and qualified they may be as social workers, are
not, nor do they claim to be, psychiatrists or psychologists. It is this
vital need that can be supplied by section 211.180-1, which would per-
mit the court to cause any child within its jurisdiction to be exam-
ined"', by a physician, psychiatrist, or psychologist appointed by the
court so that all factors affecting the child's behavior may be given
consideration in the disposition of his case.
Paragraph three of this same section provides for the establishment
of court-connected medical, psychiatric, and other facilities for the di-
agnosis and treatment of children coming before the court. This en-
tire section demonstrates the awareness by the legislative committee of
the problem confronting the present-day juvenile court and repre-
sents an enlightened step forward toward placing that court in a bet-
ter position to discharge its obligation to the child and to protect the
community.
Lest there be an inference from the foregoing discussion of medical-
psychiatric aspects of the proposed legislation that this writer be-
lieves all punitive treatment will be dumped overboard, we must point
out that every case depends upon its particular facts and circum-
stances and upon the individual as well. There may be circumstances
and there may be individuals requiring the application of punishment
as a deterrent not only to the offender himself but also to the po-
tential offender. Yet everyone must concede that, if corrective tech-
niques can be perfected to the point where they reform and rehabili-
tate, then the use of punishment exclusively as a deterrent is not ap-
100. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, CHILDREN'S BUREAU, DEP'T OF HEALTH,
EDUCATION, & WELFARE, PUB. No. 346, STANDARDS FOR SPECIALIZED COURTS DEAL-
ING WITH CHILDREN 2 (1954).
lol. The words "ard treated" were probably inadvertently omitted from
Seiiate Bill No. 15. Paragraph two of this same section provides that a public-
maintained psychiatric or health institution or clinic may be used for the purpose
of this examination and treatment.
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propriate. In theory it presently appears that youthful offenders may
roughly be separated into two groups, corrigible and incorrigible.
Obviously such classification arbitrarily disregards the very problem
that we cannot yet resolve.
Yet with this artificial division as a starting point, society must use
all available technical skill at its command in a determined effort to
separate the corrigible sheep from the incorrigible goats. If, after
proper investigation, we find that we are dealing with an incorrigible
offender, it is apparent that he should be handled in a manner entirely
different from an offender who is considered, also after proper investi-
gation, to be corrigible. Actually, the proposed legislation is an effort
to make available those indispensable services which will permit the
court to attempt an intelligent screening of children to determine,
first, appropriate handling and, second, where applicable, proper
treatment. There is no valid reason to refuse stubbornly to acknowl-
edge the accomplishments achieved in a scientific field that is so
directly related to this particular development of the juvenile court
law.
Hearing and Decree
Children's cases would be heard separately from those of adults and
the general public would be excluded under the proposed act. Practice
and procedure customary in equity proceedings would apply to hear-
ings and the old provision referring to criminal procedure1 2 would be
finally and properly eliminated. Proposed section 211.190 states that
the procedure may be as formal or informal as the juvenile court
judge considers desirable. Any variation in procedure, however, must
be within the other limitations prescribed by the act, including, of
course, the provision that practice and procedure customary in equity
proceedings shall govern.
Section 211.200 of the proposed legislation makes some changes in
provisions for the disposition of the case after the finding of fact upon
which the court exercises its jurisdiction. The right to suspend sen-
tence or execution0 3 is not retained; however, a subsequent section,04
provides that a decree0 5 may -be modified at any time on the court's
own motion.'08 The restriction placed on the juvenile court by In re
Church07 (the juvenile court had no authority to commit a minor to
a private school in another state) is lifted and institutions in other
states may be used.'08  The power to place a child in a hospital or
102. Mo. REv. STAT. § 211.020 (1949).
103. Mo. Rav. STAT. § 211.110 (1949).
104. Proposed Act § 211.250-1.
105. Proposed Act § 211.200.
106. Proper notice of the court's action is implied. Pf. Albert J. Hoppe, Inc.
v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 361 Mo. 402, 405, 235 S.W.2d 347, 349 (1951).
107. 204 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Mo. App. 1947).
108. Proposed Act § 211.200 (2) (c).
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institution for treatment or care, which is now restricted to neglected
children, 1'1 is broadened to cover all children subject to the court's
jurisdiction and is extended to include examination and treatment'"
by a physician, psychiatrist, or psychologist.
Proposed section 211.210-2 gives recognition to the importance of
social information concerning the child and requires the court to
send information concerning the child to the agency or institution to
which the child is committed. The court is to receive such information
as it may require from time to time from the agency or institution so
long as the child is subject to the court's jurisdiction. All such records
are privileged.
If the court finds a child to be mentally defective or otherwise
mentally disordered it may commit the child to any state hospital or
institution under such conditions as the court may prescribe; the order
of commitment is binding upon the hospital or institution.'- This is a
new authorization and one that is sorely needed by the court. Although
the present law provides for committing feeble-minded and epileptic
children to the Missouri State School, there is presently no require-
ment that the institution accept the child. There is no provision in
the juvenile court laws at this time for the care of mentally defective
children in this manner. Certainly if there is any validity to the doc-
trine of parens patriae, this is a special area in which society should
not be permitted to avoid its obligation to care for and protect its
charges.
The 1911 act"' - requires the juvenile court, when committing chil-
dren to other than public institutions, to place them as far as practica-
ble with an association controlled by persons of the same religious
faith as the parents of such child, or in the care and custody of some
individual holding the same religious belief as the child's parents.
Since the term "commit" is used in the sections dealing with neg-
lected' and delinquent'" children, but is not used in the adoption
sections,"' it is certainly arguable that this religious faith provision is
not applicable to adoption proceedings. Section 211.230 of the pro-
posed act, however, makes this provision specifically applicable to
adoption matters.
The power of the juvenile court to enforce the obligation of parents
to support their child who is before the juvenile court is retained in
109. Mo. RENT. STAT. § 211.050 (1949).
110. In the proposed legislation "and treated" is specified. See note 101 and
text supported thereby supra.
111. Proposed Act § 211.220.
112. Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.140 (1949).
113. Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.050 (1949).
114. Mo. REv. STAT. § 211.110 (1949).
115. Mo. REV. STAT. § 453.070 ("transfer of custody... ordered"); Mo. Ray.
STAT. § 453.080 (1949) ("a decree shall be entered" concerning adoption).
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the proposed legislation. 116 In addition, there is a new provision in
this section stating that no property is exempt from execution on such
a judgment. This conforms with a provision in divorce proceedings
relating to maintenance. 1 7
We have mentioned previously the right of the court to modify its
decree placing or committing the child in accordance with proposed
section 211.200 at any time on the court's own motion. In the pro-
posed act, a similarly broad provision gives a child committed to the
custody of an institution or agency the right, through its parents,
guardian, legal custodian, spouse, relative, or next friend, to petition
the court for a modification of the order of custody at any time. The
court may deny such a petition without a hearing or, upon a hearing,
may make appropriate orders.1 8
A substantial change is proposed in the appeal section in that ap-
peals do not act as a supersedeas unless so ordered by the court."18 At
present the filing of an appeal bond automatically acts as a super-
sedeas. 120 The present provision has had the unfortunate result of
preventing the effective treatment of children before the court be-
cause of the delay occurring between the court hearing and, in the
event of affirmance, the carrying out of the treatment ordered by the
court. It has also resulted in situations requiring the discharge of a
juvenile before the appeal is heard because he has reached his major-
ity.12 ' The time for filing the notice of appeal is definitely established
as thirty days after the entry of the "final order." Although no defini-
tion is given of "final order," it is assumed that any order under pro-
posed section 211.200 and any modification under proposed section
211.250-1 and 2 qualify as appealable orders.
Again stressing the non-criminal approach of the law and emphasiz-
ing that its prime purpose is care and guidance, the proposed act pro-
vides that the juvenile court decree is not a conviction and shall not
cause imposition of civil disabilities.1 22 The restriction against the use
of evidence adduced in the juvenile court in any other proceeding is
continued. 23 A new provision would prevent the juvenile court pro-
ceeding from disqualifying the child in any future civil or military
service application or appointment.
24
116. Proposed Act § 211.240; Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.160 (1949).
117. Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.140 (1949).
118. Proposed Act § 211.250-2.
119. Proposed Act § 211.260. Presumably "the court" refers to appellate as
well as juvenile court.
120. Mo. Ruv. STAT. § 211.170 (1949).
121. State v. Witt, 228 Mo. App. 432, 67 S.W.2d 817 (1934).
122. Proposed Act § 211.270-1.
123. Proposed Act § 211.270-3; Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.010(4) (1949).
124. This is of doubtful effect since it has no enforcement provisions. In any
event, it could not be enforced as far as the federal military service is concerned.
Proposed Act § 211.270-4.
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The non-public nature of the juvenile courts' records in adoption
proceedings established in the laws of 1941123 is now extended to all
its records, including social records, and to the records of peace officers
relating to children. These records may be inspected only by order
of the court. Peace officers' records are not subject to this restriction
if the child is transferred to a court of general jurisdiction.126
Juvenile Officers and Services
Probation officers are more appropriately designated juvenile offi-
cers.1-7 Their minimum age requirement is changed from twenty-five
to twenty-tvo. They must have satisfactorily completed four years of
college education with a major in sociology or related subjects, or
have at least four years' experience in social work with juveniles in
probation or allied services.123- This is a worth-while effort to estab-
lish professional standards within the administrative structure of the
juvenile court. The public may rightly expect, even demand, that the
problems of delinquent and neglected children be handled by trained,
competent personnel. This section contains a "grandfather clause,"
which excludes its application to present incumbents until their exist-
ing appointments terminate."-9
Salaries of the juvenile officers have been increased to keep pace
with the effort to increase professional standards. The maximum pay-
able to the chief juvenile officer in first-class counties and the City of
St. Louis is set at $8,000 per annum. This is an increase from $6,600
or $6,300, depending upon the population of the county. Deputy ju-
venile officers are to receive such salary as may be prescribed by the
court. For the first time juvenile officers in counties of the first class
are to be reimbursed for their actual expenses incurred while in the
performance of their official duties and are not limited to a maximum
reimbursement of $200 per year. 130
One of the most effective moves to strengthen the court's services
to the public throughout the state is the provision in proposed section
211.360, whereby the state comes to the financial assistance of the
county by paying one-half the salaries of the juvenile officer and a
specified number of his deputy juvenile officers.
The duties of the juvenile officer, although more detailed in the pro-
125. Mo. REv. STAT. § 453.120 (1949).
126. Proposed Act § 211.310.
127. Proposed Act § 211.350. In counties of the second class, the term "juvenile
officer" came into use in 1945. Mo. REv. STAT. § 211.220 (1949).
128. Proposed Act § 211.350.
129. It is suggested that this section meant to refer to education and training
in social work rather than in sociology. If this is correct, the four-year college
requirement is not pertinent since it is the writer's understanding that most
schools of social work are now graduate schools and that a degree in social work
requires two years of graduate work.
130. Proposed Act § 211.360; see Mo. Ruv. STAT. § 211.250 (1949).
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
posed act, remain substantially the same as at present with one excep-
tion. It is stated that his presence is required at all proceedings in the
juvenile court "except in adoption proceedings."131 This writer be-
lieves that the juvenile officer presently performs an important func-
tion in adoption hearings and his presence certainly should not be pro-
hibited even by implication.
General
The continuation of the obligation of prosecuting officials to lend
assistance to the juvenile officers 32 is again a mark of the impact of
criminal procedure on the juvenile courts. Inasmuch as this proposed
legislation has made it abundantly clear that the court is no longer to
be used for criminal prosecutions, it would appear that any legal
assistance the juvenile officer may require in the preparation of
documents or in hearings before the court could be given more appro-
priately by counsel appointed by the court under the provision of
proposed section 211.340-1 relating to the appointment of "other
necessary juvenile court personnel."
Peace officers who take a child into custody are required to so ad-
vise the juvenile officer "immediately" and to furnish the juvenile
officer all facts in their possession pertaining to the child.3 3 This
supplements the provisions of section 211.050-1 of the proposed act
and section 211.060 of the Revised Statutes of 1949. It seems to make
rather clear the obligation of all peace officers to cooperate with the
juvenile court in all matters properly in that court's jurisdiction. This
may do much to aid the juvenile court in functioning at full effective-
ness in a field that heretofore has been, to some extent at least,
usurped by unauthorized officials. If the juvenile court is to bear the
responsibility for the improper acts of children, it should be given the
opportunity to discharge those functions vested in it by law.
A further provision in section 211.390-3, authorizing the juvenile
court to seek the cooperation of all persons or organizations interested
in the welfare of children, is a proper admonition to the court. The
court should not remain aloof from others seeking to aid and protect
children. Likewise, the cooperation of these other groups should be
made readily available to the juvenile court, for with their help the
court can be materially assisted in accomplishing its purposes. This
is particularly true in the court's relation to the families of children,
and it is with this problem particularly that private agencies should
be willing to cooperate closely with the court.
131., Proposed Act § 211.380-1(4).
132. Proposed Act § 211.390-1.
133. Proposed Act § 211.390-2.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1957/iss1/7
THE JUVENILE COURT CONCEPT IN MISSOURI 47
CONCLUSION
It is not strange to find that the juvenile court is criticized by some
who resent what they call the legalistic emphasis that they seem to
think is developing within it, and by others who are equally resentful
of what to them appears to be the summary manner in which the
court in some instances has dealt with parental rights and the freedom
of children. Even these critics must concede, however, that the ju-
venile court is operating in a field that is fundamentally based on law
and is a highly specialized field, and that the court can function prop-
erly only if it has as many services available to it as public and
private resources can provide. The writer is in agreement with the
thinking that juvenile laws should be administered by a court of gen-
eral jurisdiction,'," as the circuit court, having at its disposal all those
specialized services and facilities necessary to carry out its proper
functions. There is a danger that a separate court, which by. definition
must be a court of limited jurisdiction, might, in its single-mindedness
and near-sighted enthusiasm, attain an imbalance between the pro-
tection of the rights of parents and children and the care and treat-
ment it insists must be accorded children.
It is submitted that the ultimate goal of laws affecting juveniles is
prevention of serious delinquency and criminality. This may be ac-
complished initially by making available to the juvenile court all
facilities for the discovery of delinquent children and those evidencing
marked personality defects. Prevention of delinquency and emotional
disorders is the goal of other children's services including child
guidance clinics. It is, however, well known that, because of the lack
of basic authority in dealing with delinquent children, such treatment
often fails to accomplish the most desired results. It is submitted that
the juvenile court may serve as a more effective substitute parental
authority in setting proper and consistent limits for the child's be-
havior. In exercising this authority, once the delinquent is discovered,
it becomes necessary to diagnose his problem. Here the services of a
competent psychiatrist and a properly trained staff are fundamental.
After diagnosis comes treatment. Treatment to be effective requires
as an absolute minimum the technical skill of competent professional
personnel. It is these fundamental services13:7 that the joint legislative
134. This is not meant to imply approval of what Judge Julian W. Mack
condemns as "the vicious practice.., indulged in of assigning a different judge
to the juvenile-court work every month or every three months .... The service
should under no circumstances be for less than one year, and preferably for a
longer period. ... " The Jzo'enile Court, 23 HARv. L. Ruv. 104, 119 (1909). Judge
Mack was at one time a juvenile court judge "by assignment."
135. It is the opinion of the writer that these facilities may be, in fact, so
fundamental and necessary to the proper functioning of the circuit court, acting
as a juvenile court, that they are a part of the "inherent powers" of the court.
Such powers are those recognized as existing in the court to do all things that
are reasonably necessary for the court to preserve its existence and to function
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committee would make available to the juvenile court and to the public
in the proposed juvenile court act it has drafted.
It is felt that the proposed legislation presented by the joint com-
mittee of the Missouri legislature proceeds on a sound basic formula
and would make it possible for the circuit courts of Missouri to do a
capable job in the juvenile court field.
APPENDIX
SENATE BiLL No. 15
69th General Assembly
AN ACT
211.010. 1. The purpose of this act is to facilitate the care, protection and
discipline of children who come within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. This
act shall be liberally construed, therefore, to the end that each child coming within
the jurisdiction of the juvenile court shall receive such care, guidance and control,
preferably' in his own home, as will conduce to the child's welfare and the best
interests of the state and that when such child is removed from the control of his
parents the court shall secure for him care as nearly as possible equivalent to
that which should have been given him by them.
211.020. As used in this act, unless the context clearly requires otherwise:
(1) "Adult", means a person eighteen years of age or older;
(2) "Child", means a person under eighteen years of age;
(3) "Juvenile court", means the Cape Girardeau court of common pleas and
the circuit court of each county, except that in the judicial circuits having more
than one judge, the term means the juvenile division of the circuit court of the
county;(4) "Legal custody", means the right to the care, custody and control of a
child and the duty to provide food, clothing, shelter, ordinary medical care, educa-
tion, treatment and discipline of a child. Legal custody may be taken from a
parent only by court action and if the legal custody is taken from a parent with-
out termination of parental rights, the parent's duty to Provide support continues
even though the person having legal custody may provide the necessities of daily
living;(5) "Parent" means either a natural parent or a parent by adoption and if the
child is illegitimate, "parent" means the mother.
211.030. Except as otherwise provided herein, the juvenile court shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction in proceedings:
(1) Involving any child who may be within the county who is alleged to be in
need of care and treatment because:
(a) The parents or other persons legally responsible for the care and support
of the child neglect or refuse to provide proper support, education which is re-
quired by law, medical, surgical or other care necessary for his well-being; except
that reliance by a parent, guardian or custodian upon remedial treatment other
than medical or surgical treatment for a child shall not be construed as neglect
when the treatment is recognized or permitted under the laws of this state; or
(b) The child is otherwise without proper care, custody or support; or
as a court. These powers exist merely because it is a court irrespective of legisla-
tive or constitutional grant. State ex rel. Gentry v. Becker, 351 Mo. 769, 777-78
174 S.W.2d 181, 183-84 (1943) ; Clark v. Austin, 340 Mo. 467, 487-88, 101 S.W.2d
977, 988 (1937) (concurring opinion). This principle was stated by Judge Lamm
as follows:
It has always been the rule that, when a clear main power is granted by
the law, everything necessary to make it effectual to attain its principal
end is necessarily implied. A grant of power is to be construed so as to in-
clude the authority to do all usual things necessary to accomplish the object
so granted.
Shull v. Boyd, 251 Mo. 452, 477, 158 S.W. 313, 320 (1913).
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(c) The behavior, environment or associations of the child are injurious to his
welfare or to the welfare of others; or
(d) The child has violated a state law or municipal ordinance;
(2) Concerning any minor eighteen years of age or older who may be within
the county, and who is alleged to have violated a state law or municipal ordinance
prior to having become eighteen years of age;(3) For the suspension or revocation of a state or local license or authority of
a child to operate a motor vehicle;(4) For the adoption of a person;(5) For the commitment of a child to the guardianship of the department of
public health and welfare as provided by law.
211.040. Nothing contained in this act deprives other courts of the right to
determine the legal custody of children upon writs of habeas corpus or to deter-
mine the legal custody or guardianship of children when the legal custody or
guardianship is incidental to the determination of causes pending in other courts.
Such questions, however, may be certified by another court to the juvenile court
for hearing, determination or recommendation.
211.050. 1. When a child is taken into custody with or without warrant for
an offense, the child together with any information concerning him and the per-
sonal property found in his possession, shall be taken immediately and directly
before the juvenile court or delivered to the juvenile officer or person acting for
him.
2. If any person is taken before a magistrate or police judge of another court,
and it is then, or at any time thereafter, ascertained that he was under the age
of eighteen years at the time he is alleged to have committed the offense, or that
he is subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court as provided by this act, it is
the duty of the magistrate or judge forthwith to transfer the case or refer the
matter to the juvenile court, and direct the delivery of such person, together with
information concerning him and the personal property found in his possession, to
the juvenile officer or person acting as such. The juvenile court shall proceed as
in other cases instituted under this act.
211.060. When jurisdiction over the person of a child has been acquired by
the juvenile court under the provisions of this act in proceedings coming within
the applicable provisions of section 211.030, the jurisdiction of the child may be
retained for the purpose of this act until he has attained the age of twenty-one
years, except in cases where he is committed to and received by the state board
of training schools.
211.070. In the discretion of the judge of a juvenile court, any petition under
this act alleging that a child of the age of fourteen years or older has committed
an offense which would be a felony if committed by an adult, or that a minor,
between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one years or over whom the juvenile
court has jurisdiction has violated any state law or municipal ordinance, may be
dismissed and such child or minor may be prosecuted under the general law,
whenever the judge after receiving the report of the investigation required by
this act and hearing evidence finds that such child or minor is not a proper sub-ject to be dealt with under the provisions of this act.
211.080. Whenever any person informs the court in person and in writing
that a child appears to be within the purview of applicable provisions of section
211.030 of this act, the court shall make or cause to be made a preliminary in-
quiry to determine the facts and to determine whether or not the interests of the
public or of the child require that further action be taken. On the basis of this
inquiry the juvenile court may make such informal adjustment as is practicable
without a petition or may authorize the filing of a petition by the juvenile officer.
211.090. 1. The petition shall be entitled "In the interest of ............................
......... .................... ............. a child under eighteen years of age".
2. The petition shall set forth plainly:
( 1) The facts which bring the child within the jurisdiction of the court;
(2) The full name, birth date, and residence of the child;(3) The names and residence of his parents, if living;
(4) The name and residence of his legal guardian if there be one, of the per-
son having custody of the child or of the nearest known relative if no parent or
guardian can be found; and
(5) Any other pertinent data or information.
.3. If any facts required in subsection 2 of this section are not known by the
petitioner, the petition shall so state.
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* 211.100. 1. After a petition has been filed, unless the parties appear volun-
tarily, the juvenile court shall issue a summons in the name of the state of
Missouri requiring the person who has custody of the child to appear personally
and, unless the court orders otherwise, to bring the child before the court, at the
time and place stated.
2. If the person so summoned is other than a parent or guardian of the child,
then the parent or guardian or both shall also be notified of the pendency of the
case and of the time and place appointed.
3. If it appears that the child is in such condition or surroundings that his
welfare requires that his custody be immediately assumed by the court, the judge
may order, by endorsement upon the summons, the officer serving it to take the
child into custody at once.
4. Summons may be issued requiring the appearance of any other person
whose presence, in the opinion of the judge, is necessary.
. 211.110. 1. Service of summons shall be made personally by the delivery of
an attested copy thereof to the person summoned. But if the juvenile court is
satisfied after thorough investigation that it is impracticable to serve the sum-
mons personally, it may order service by registered mail to the last known address
of the person.
2. Personal service shall be effected at least twenty-four hours before the
time set for the hearing. Registered mail shall be mailed at least five days before
the time of the hearing.
3. Service of summons may be made by any suitable person under the direc-
tion of the court.
211.120. If any person summoned by personal service fails without reasonable
cause to appear, he may be proceeded against for contempt of court. In case the
parties fail to obey the summons or, in any case when it appears to the court that
the service will be ineffectual a capias may be issued for the parent or guardian,
or for the child.
211.130. 1. When any child found violating any law or ordinance or whose
behavior, environment or associations are injurious to his welfare or to the wel-
fare of others or who is without proper care, custody or support is taken into
custody, the taking into custody is not considered an arrest.
2. When a child is taken into custody, the parent, legal custodian or guardian
of the child shall be notified as soon as possible.
3. The jurisdiction of the court attaches from the time the child is taken into
custody.
211.140. 1. When a child is taken into custody as provided in section 211.130
the person taking the child into custody shall, unless it is impracticable, undesir-
able, or has been otherwise ordered by the court, return the child to his parent,
guardian or legal custodian on the promise of such person to bring the child to
court, if necessary, at a stated time or at such times as the court may direct. If
the person taking the child into custody believes it desirable, he may request the
parent, guardian or legal custodian to sign a written promise to bring the child
into court.
2. If the child is not released as provided in subsection 1 of this section, he
may be detained in any place of detention specified in section 211.150 but only on
order of the court specifying the reason for detention. The parent, guardian or
legal custodian of the child shall be notified of the place of detention as soon as
possible.
3. If, because of the unreasonableness of the hour or the fact that it is a
Sunday or holiday, it is impractical to obtain a written order from the court, the
child may be detained without an order of the court for a period not to exceed
twenty-four hours, but a written record of such detention shall be kept and a
report in writing filed with the court. In the event that the judge is absent from
his circuit, or is unable to act, the approval of another circuit judge of the same
or adjoining circuit must be obtained as a condition for detaining a child for
more than twenty-four hours.
211.150. 1. Pending disposition of a case, the juvenile court may order in
writing the detention of a child in one of the following places:
(1) A detention home provided by the county;(2) A foster home, subject to the supervision of the court;(3) A suitable place of detention maintained by an association having for one
of its objects the care and protection of children;
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(4) A jail or other facility for the detention of adults, if the child's habits or
conduct are such as to constitute a menace to himself or others and then only if
he is placed in a room or ward entirely separate from adults confined therein;
(5) Or such other suitable custody as the court may direct.
2. Neither finger prints nor a photograph shall be taken of a child taken into
custody for any purpose without the consent of the juvenile judge.
211.160. 1. In each county of the first and second classes and in the city of
st. Louis, it is the duty of the county court, or, where there is no county court,
such other authorized body, to provide a place of detention for children coming
within the provisions of this act. It is also the duty of the county court or other
authorized body to provide offices for the personnel of the juvenile court.
2. The place of detention shall be so located and arranged that the child being
detained does not come in contact, at any time or in any manner, with adults con-
victed or under arrest, and the care of children in detention shall approximate as
closely as possible the care of children in good homes.
:. The place of detention shall be in charge of a superintendent. The judge
of the juvenile court shall appoint and fix the compensation and maintenance of
the superintendent and of any assistants or other personnel required to operate
the detention facility. Such compensation and maintenance are payable out of
funds of the county.
4. The county court or other governing body of the county is authorized to
ae or to acquire by purchase, gift or device [s-ic] land for such purpose, and to
, ect buildings thereon and to provide funds to equip and maintain the same for
th subsistence and education of the children placed therein.
211.170. 1. Counties of the third and fourth classes within one judicial
clicuit, shall, upon the written recommendation of the circuit judge of that judi-
cial circuit, establish a place of juvenile detention to serve all of the counties
within that judicial circuit, and in like manner, the counties shall supply offices
for the juvenile officers of that circuit. The recommendation of the circuit judge
shall be made only after a hearing conducted by him, after thirty days' notice, to
determine the need and feasibility of establishing such a place of detention within
the judicial circuit. The provisions of section 211.160 apply as to the form of
operation and means of maintenance of the place of detention, except that the
total cost of establishment and operation of the places of detention shall be pro-
rated among the several counties within that judicial circuit upon a ratio to be
determined by a comparison of the respective populations of the counties. The
point of location of the place of juvenile detention shall be determined by the
ciicuit judge of the judicial circuit.
2. Circuit judges of any two or more adjoining judicial circuits after a hear-
ing as provided in subsection 1 of this section may, by agreement confirmed by
judicial order, and in the interest of economy of administration, establish one
place of juvenile detention to serve their respective judicial circuits. In such
event, the circuit judges so agreeing shall jointly govern the affairs of the place
of detention and the cost thereof shall be apportioned among the counties served
in the manner provided for in subsection 1 of this section.
3. Any county of the third or fourth classes desiring to provide its own place
of juvenile detention may do so in the manner prescribed for counties of the first
and second classes.
211.180. 1. The court may cause any child within its jurisdiction to be
xcfamined by a physician, psychiatrist or psychologist appointed by the court in
oi der that the condition of the child may be given consideration in the disposition
of his case. The expenses of the examination, when approved by the court shall
he paid by the county.
2. The services of a state, county or municipally maintained hospital, institu-
tion, or psychiatric or health clinic may be used for the purpose of this examina-
tion and treatment.
3. A county may establish medical, psychiatric and other facilities, upon re-
quest of the juvenile court, to provide proper services for the court in the diag-
nosis and treatment of children coming before it and these facilities shall be under
the- administration and control of the juvenile court. The juvenile court may
appoint and fix the compensation of such professional and other personnel as it
deems necessary to provide the court proper diagnostic, clinical and treatment
services for children under its jurisdiction.
211.9o. 1. The procedure to be followed at the hearing shall be determined
I, the juvenile court judge and may be as formal or informal as he considers
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desirable.. He may take testimony and inquire into the habits, surroundings, con-
ditions and tendencies of the child to enable the court to render such order or
judgment as will best promote the welfare of the child and carry out the objec-
tives of this act.
2. The hearing may, in the discretion of the court, proceed in the absence of
the child and may be adjourned from time to time.
3. All cases of children shall be heard separately from the trial of cases
against adults.
4. Stenographic notes or an authorized recording of the hearing shall be re-
quired if the court so orders or if requested by any party interested in the pro-
ceeding.
5. The general public shall be excluded and only such persons admitted as
have a direct interest in the case or in the work of the court.
6. The practice and procedure customary in proceedings in equity shall govern
all proceedings in the juvenile court.
211.200. When a child is found by the court to come within the applicable
provisions of section 211.030 of this act, the court shall so decree and make a find-
ing of fact upon which it exercises its jurisdiction over the child and the court
may, by order duly entered, proceed as follows:
(1) Place the child under supervision in his own home or in custody of a
relative or other suitable person upon such conditions as the court may require;
(2) Commit the child to the custody of:
(a) A public agency or institution authorized by law to care for children or to
place them in family homes;
(b) Any other institution or agency which is licensed to care for children or
to place them in family homes;
(c) An association, school or institution willing to receive it in another state
if the approval of the agency in that state which administers the laws relating to
importation of children into the state has been secured;
(d) The juvenile officer; or
(3) Place the child in a family home;
(4) Cause the child to be examined and treated by a physician, psychiatrist or
psychologist and when the health or condition of the child requires it, cause the
child to be placed in a public or private hospital, clinic or institution for treat-
ment and care, except that nothing contained herein authorizes, the court to takejurisdiction of a child when the parent or guardian, relies upon remedial treat-
ment other than medical or surgical when the treatment is recognized or per-
mitted under the laws of this state;
(5) Suspend or revoke a state or local license or authority of a child to operate
a motor vehicle.
211.210. 1. All commitments made by the juvenile court shall be for an in-
determinate period of time and shall not continue beyond the child's twenty-first
birthday.
2. Whenever the court commits a child to an institution or agency, it shall
transmit with the order of commitment a summary of its information concerning
the child, and the institution or agency shall give to the court such information
concerning the child as the court may require from time to time so long as the
child is under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. This information, together
with all other records transmitted to the institution or agency, are privileged and
for the benefit of the child only. They may be examined or subpoenaed only upon
approval of the court which committed the child to the institution or agency.
211.220. 1. When a child coming under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court
is found to be feeble-minded, epileptic, mentally defective or otherwise mentally
disordered, the juvenile court may commit the child to the Missouri state school,
the St. Louis training school or other state hospital or institution under such
condition, as the court may prescribe and the order of commitment shall be bind-
ing upon the hospital or institution to which the child is committed.
2. Whenever a child is committed to the state board of training schools and
subsequently is found to be feeble-minded, epileptic, mentally defective or other-
wise mentally disordered, the state board of training schools may order the trans-
fer of the child to a proper state supported hospital or institution for care and
treatment subject to the jurisdiction of the board. Such hospital or institution
shall, without delay, accept the child for care and treatment for so long a period
as is deemed necessary except that when a child for any reason ceases to come
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under the jurisdiction of the state board of training schools, he may be retained
as a patient in the institution or hospital only after proper proceedings have been
instituted and held as otherwise required by law.
211.230. In placing a child in or committing a child to the custody of an in-
dividual or of a private agency or institution and in granting adoptions the court
shall whenever practicable select either a person, or an agency or institution gov-
erned by persons, of the same religious faith as that of the parents of such child,
or in case of a difference in the religious faith of the parents, then of the re-
ligious faith of the child, or if the religious faith of the child is not ascertainable,
then of the faith of either of the parents.
211.240. 1. When the juvenile court finds a child to be within the purview of
applicable provisions of section 211.030 of this act it may in the same or subse-
quent proceedings, either on its own motion or upon the application of any person,
institution or agency having the custody of such child, proceed to inquire into the
ability of the parent of the child to support it or to contribute to its support. If
the parent does not voluntarily appear for the proceeding, he shall be summoned
in the same manner as in civil cases and the summons in the case may issue to
any county of the state.
2. If the court finds that the parent is able to support the child or to con-
tribute to its support, the court may enter an order requiring the parent to sup-
port the child or to contribute to its support and to pay the costs of collecting thejudgment.
3. The court may enforce the order by execution and the execution may issue
on request of the juvenile officer or any person, agency or institution which has
been awarded custody of the child. No deposit or bond for costs shall be required
as a condition for the issuance or service of the execution. No property is exempt
from execution upon a judgment or decree made under this section, and all wages
or other sums due the parent is subject to garnishment or execution in any pro-
ceedinDgs under this section.
4. Otherwise the necessary support of the child shall, unless the court com-
mits the child to a person or institution willing to receive it without charge, be
paid out of the funds of the county but only upon approval of the judge of thejuvenile court.
211.250. 1. A decree of the juvenile court made under the provisions of sec-
tion 211.200 may be modified at any time on the court's own motion.
2. The parent, guardian, legal custodian, spouse, relative or next friend of a
child committed to the custody of an institution or agency may, at any time, peti-
tion the court for a modification of the order of custody. The court may deny the
petition without hearing or may, in its discretion, conduct a hearing upon the
issues raised and may make any orders relative to the issues as it deems proper.
8. The authority of the juvenile court to modify a decree is subject to the
provisions of chapter 219, RSMo 1949.
211.260. An appeal shall be allowed to the child from any final judgment,
order or decree made under the provisions of this act and may be taken on the
part of the child by its parent, guardian, legal custodian, spouse, relative or next
friend. An appeal shall be allowed to a parent from any final judgment, order or
decree made under the provisions of this act which adversely affects him. Notice
of appeal shall be filed within thirty days after the final judgment, order or decree
has been entered but neither the notice of appeal nor any motion filed subsequent
to the final judgment acts as a supersedeas unless the court so orders.
211.270. 1. No adjudication by the juvenile court upon the status of a child
shall be deemed a conviction nor shall the adjudication operate to impose any of
the civil disabilities ordinarily resulting from conviction nor shall the child be
found guilty or be deemed a criminal by reason of the adjudication.
2. No child shall be charged with a crime or convicted unless the case is
transferred to a court of general jurisdiction as provided in this act.
8. Evidence given in cases under this act is not lawful or proper evidence
against the child for any purpose whatever in a civil, criminal or other proceed-
ing except in subsequent cases under this act.
4. The disposition made of a child and the evidence given in the court does
not operate to disqualify the child in any future civil or military service applica-
tion or appointment.
211.280. 1. In counties of the first and second class and in the city of St.
Louis a court room, to be designated the juvenile court room, shall be provided by
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the county or circuit court of the county or city, as the case may be, for the hear-
ing of cases under this act.
2. In case of the absence or inability of the judge of the juvenile court in any
such county to hold court, any one of the circuit judges in the judicial circuit may
perform that duty.
211.290. 1. In counties of the third and fourth class hearings may be con-
ducted in the judge's chambers or in such other room or apartment as may be
provided or designated by the judge of the juvenile court.
2. In case of the absence of [sic] inability of the juvenile judge to hold court,
he may call in another circuit judge to perform that duty. Any juvenile judge hav-
ing more than one county within his circuit, may, in his discretion, and in the
interests of the welfare of the child involved, act upon a juvenile case arising
within that circuit, irrespective of where, within the circuit, he may then be hold-
ing court.
211.300. The clerk of the Cape Girardeau court of common pleas and the
clerk of the circuit court shall act as the clerk of the juvenile court.
211.310. 1. The proceedings of the juvenile court shall be entered in a book
kept for that purpose and known as the juvenile records. These records as well
as all information obtained and social records prepared in the discharge of official
duty for the court shall be open to inspection only by order of the court to persons
having a legitimate interest therein.
2. Peace officers' records, if any are kept, of children, shall be kept separate
from the records of persons over seventeen years of age and shall not be open to
inspection or their contents disclosed, except by order of the court. This subsec-
tion does not apply to children who are transferred to courts of general jurisdic-
tion as provided by section 211.070 of this act.
3. During the month of January in each year, the court may make an order
to destroy all social histories and information other than the official court file,
pertaining to any person who has reached the age of twenty-one years.
211.320. The costs of the proceedings in any case in the juvenile court may,
in the discretion of the court, be adjudged against the parents of the child in-
volved or the informing witness as provided in section 211.080 as the case may
be, and collected as provided by law. All costs not so collected shall be paid by
the county.
211.330. 1. After any child has come under the care or control of the juve-
nile court as provided in this act, any person who thereafter encourages, aids, or
causes the child to commit any act or engage in any conduct which would be in-
jurious to his morals or health or who knowingly or negligently disobeys, violates
or interferes with a lawful order of the court with relation to the child, is guilty
of contempt of court, and shall be proceeded against as now provided by law and
punished by imprisonment in the county jail for a term not exceeding six months
or by a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars or by both such fine and imprison-
ment.
2. If it appears at a juvenile court hearing that any person eighteen years
of age or over has violated section 559.360, RSMo 1949, by contributing to the
delinquency of a minor, the judge of the juvenile court shall refer the information
to the prosecuting or circuit attorney, as the case may be, for appropriate pro-
ceedings.
211.340. 1. The juvenile court shall appoint a juvenile officer and other neces-
sary juvenile court personnel to serve under the direction of the court in each
county in the judicial circuit except that in counties where such appointments are
deemed impracticable for any reason:(1) The juvenile court may appoint a juvenile officer and other necessary
personnel to serve two or more counties in the judicial circuit; or
(2) Circuit judges of any two or more adjoining circuits may by agreement,
confirmed by judicial order, appoint a juvenile officer and other necessary person-
nel to serve their respective judicial circuits and in such a case the juvenile
officers and other persons appointed shall serve under the joint direction of thejudges so agreeing.
2. In the event a juvenile officer and other juvenile court personnel are ap-
pointed to serve two or more counties as provided in subdivisions (1) and (2) of
subsection 1 of this section, the total cost to the counties for the compensation of
these persons shall be prorated among the several counties and upon a ratio to be
determined by a comparison of the respective populations of the counties.
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211.350. 1. Whenever the need arises for the appointment of a juvenile
officer, the juvenile court may:
(1) Provide, by rule of court, for open competitive written and oral examina-
tions and create an eligible list of persons who possess the qualifications pre-
scribed by subdivision (2) of this section and who have successfully passed such
examination; or
(2) The court may appoint any person over the age of twenty-one years who
has completed satisfactorily four years of college education with a major in
sociology or related subjects or who, in lieu of such academic training, has had
four years or more experience in social work with juveniles in probation or allied
services.
2. This section does not terminate the existing appointment nor present term
of office of any juvenile officer or deputy juvenile officer in any county, but it
applies to any appointment to be made after the existing appointment or term
of office of any incumbent terminates or expires for any reason whatsoever.
211.,360. 1. In each county of the first class and in the city of St. Louis, thejuvenile officer shall receive such salary as may be prescribed by the circuit court,
but not less than four thousand five hundred dollars per year nor more than
eight thousand dollars per year. Each deputy juvenile officer shall receive such
salary as may be prescribed by the circuit court. The salary of the supervising
officer assigned to courts of domestic relations shall be prescribed by the circuit
court and shall not exceed six thousand dollars per year.
2. Clerical and stenographic assistants to the juvenile court shall receive such
salary as the circuit court may determine.
3. Actual expense, exclusive of office expense, incurred by the juvenile officer
and deputy juvenile officers while in the performance of their official duties shall
be reimbursed to them out of county or city funds upon the approval of the judge
of the juvenile court.
4. The salaries of juvenile officers and of not more than ten deputy juvenile
officers in each such county are payable monthly, one half by the state out of the
state treasury and one half by the county or city. The salaries of clerks, ste-
nographers, and deputy juvenile officers in excess of ten, in each county, are pay-
able monthly out of the funds of the city or county.
211.370. 1. Juvenile officers in counties of the second, third or fourth class
shall receive such salary as may be prescribed by the circuit courts served by
them, but not less than two thousand four hundred dollars per year and not more
than six thousand dollars per year. Deputy juvenile officers, clerical and steno-
graphic assistants shall receive such salary as the circuit court may determine.
2. Actual expenses, exclusive of office expense, incurred by the juvenile officer
and deputy juvenile officers while in the performance of their official duties shall
be reimbursed to them out of the funds of the county or counties.
3. The salaries of the juvenile officer and of not more than two deputy juve-
nile officers serving under him are payable monthly, one-half by the state out of
the state treasury and one half [sic] by the county out of county funds. The sala-
ries of deputy juvenile officers in excess of two for each juvenile officer appointed
and of clerks and stenographers are payable monthly out of county funds. That
part of the salaries and expenses of a juvenile officer and other juvenile court per-
sonnel serving two or more counties which is payable out of county funds shall be
prorated among the several counties served upon a ratio to be determined by a
comparison of the respective populations of the counties.
211.380. 1. The juvenile officer shall, under direction of the juvenile court:
(1) Organize, direct and develop the administrative work of the court;
(2) Make such investigations and furnish the court with such information and
assistance as the judge may require;
(3) Keep a written record of such investigations and submit reports thereon
to the judge;
(4) Be present during all proceedings in the juvenile court, except in adoption
proceedings, in order to represent the interests of children coming within the
purview of this act;
(5) Take charge of children before and after the hearing as may be directed
by the court;
(6) Perform such other duties and exercise such powers as the judge of thejuvenile court may direct.
2. The juvenile officer is vested with all the power and authority of sheriffs
to make arrests and perform other duties incident to his office.
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3. The juvenile officers or other persons acting as such in the several counties
of the state shall cooperate with each other in carrying out the purposes and pro-
visions of this act.
211.390. 1. It is the duty of circuit, prosecuting and city attorneys, and
county counsellors representing the state or a city in any court, to give thejuvenile officer such aid and cooperation as may not be inconsistent with the
duties of their offices.
2. It is the duty of police officers, constables, sheriffs and other authorized
persons taking a child into custody to give information of that fact immediately
to the juvenile officer or one of his deputies and to furnish the juvenile officer all
the facts in his possession pertaining to the child, its parents, guardian or other
persons interested in the child together with the reasons for taking the child into
custody.
3. It is the duty of all other public officials and departments to render all
assistance and cooperation within their jurisdictional power which may further
the objects of this act. The court is authorized to seek the cooperation of all
societies and organizations having for their object the protection or aid of chil-
dren and of any person or organization interested in the welfare of children.
211.400. Nothing in this act shall be construed to repeal any part of the law
relating to the state training school for girls or the state training school for boys;
and in all commitments to either of these institutions the law in reference to them
shall govern.
211.410. Any person over the age of seventeen years who willfully violates,
neglects or refuses to obey or perform any lawful order of the court, or who
violates any provision of this act is guilty of a misdemeanor.
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